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The Valuation Implications of the 2026 M&A Surge: What the 65% Deal Volume Jump Means for PPA Timelines, WACC, and Goodwill

When the Deal Market Accelerates, the Valuation Problems Follow — Usually 90 Days Later

Between February and April 2026, corporate dealmaking accelerated sharply. Transactions above US$100 million rose 65% in value and 17% in volume compared with the same period in 2025. The headline driver was a resurgence in US$5 billion-plus megadeals, where value surged 149% alongside a 94% increase in volume.

Every financial publication has covered the deal surge. The Goldman Sachs forecasts, the EY deal barometers, the PE confidence surveys — the story of 2026 as a breakout M&A year is well-documented and widely understood.

What is not being written about — at least not with the specificity that CFOs, CPA firm partners, and advisory teams actually need — is what happens 90 days after the deal closes. Because that is when the valuation consequences of a deal surge arrive, and they arrive all at once.

The 65% jump in deal value does not mean 65% more deal signings and champagne. It means 65% more Purchase Price Allocations due within 12 months under ASC 805. It means 65% more WACC constructions being built in an environment where the inputs — risk-free rate, equity risk premium, beta, credit spreads — are simultaneously more volatile and more consequential than they have been in years. It means 65% more goodwill balances sitting on newly acquired balance sheets, each one a latent impairment risk that will be tested annually for the life of the acquiring entity.

This blog is written for the professionals who are managing those 90-day consequences right now: the CFO of a company that closed an acquisition in Q1 2026 and is staring at an ASC 805 measurement period clock, the CPA firm partner with three PPA engagements in queue and one analyst available, the M&A advisory team that advised on a megadeal and now needs to support the post-close accounting. It is also written for the PE fund manager whose portfolio company just completed an add-on acquisition and whose auditor is asking for the opening balance sheet within 45 days.

The surge is real. The valuation backlog it has created is real. The specific technical challenges embedded in that backlog — in the current macro environment, with the current deal structures, at the current price levels — are what this blog addresses.

The Deal Surge in Precise Terms — What the Numbers Actually Mean

Before addressing the valuation implications, it is worth being precise about the nature of the 2026 deal surge. Because the pattern of deals that has emerged is not simply “more of the same” — it is a structurally different deal market than the one that existed in 2023 or 2024, and that structural difference has direct valuation consequences.

The K-Shaped Recovery — Fewer Deals, Larger Ones

While overall deal volume has started 2026 slowly, the number of megadeals above US$1 billion has more than doubled year-over-year. This is what analysts are calling the K-shaped M&A recovery: the top of the market — megadeals, strategic acquisitions, AI-driven consolidation — is booming. The middle market is recovering more gradually. The lower-middle market is still constrained by leverage limitations and valuation gaps.

In January 2026 alone, total tech M&A deal value reached $43.2 billion — up from $26 billion in January 2025 — driven primarily by megadeals over $1 billion. During the same window, the number of transactions valued over $100 million fell from 47 to 30.

The valuation implication of this K-shape is immediate and specific: the PPA complexity of the current deal market is disproportionately high relative to deal volume. A market with 30 transactions over $100 million but concentrated in billion-dollar-plus megadeals generates far more complex PPA work than a market with 47 smaller transactions. The intangible asset universe in a $5 billion AI infrastructure acquisition — developed technology, customer contracts, proprietary data, assembled workforce, non-compete agreements — is an order of magnitude more complex than the intangible analysis for a $150 million regional services acquisition.

AI as the Acquisition Rationale — The Valuation Consequence

Buyers remain highly motivated to secure AI-ready capabilities and maintain or grow their market positioning. This motivation is the primary narrative of the 2026 deal surge, and it creates a specific PPA challenge that has not existed in prior deal cycles.

When a company is acquired for its AI capabilities — its data assets, its proprietary models, its AI-native technology stack, its machine learning workforce — the PPA must identify and separately value each of those components as identifiable intangible assets under ASC 805. The question of whether a proprietary large language model is a developed technology intangible or an assembled workforce asset (or both) is not settled accounting. The question of how to value a dataset — a data moat that has value precisely because of its scale and uniqueness — does not have a standard MPEEM or relief-from-royalty solution that most valuation teams have encountered in prior work. And the question of how to value AI-native workforce — the researchers, engineers, and data scientists whose human capital is inseparable from the technology they built — is an emerging area with no consensus methodology.

Every AI-driven megadeal closed in 2026 is generating a PPA that requires answers to these questions. The answers will be reviewed by Big Four auditors, tested against ASC 805 guidance, and ultimately reflected in amortization schedules that affect the acquirer’s reported earnings for years. Getting them wrong — in either direction — has real financial statement consequences.

The Private Equity Add-On Wave

Deal activity is improving, in part due to creative approaches to capital deployment, from carve-outs to take privates to secondary investments. Traditional buyouts remain constrained by leverage limitations and persistent valuation gaps, but firms are broadening their toolkits.

Beyond the megadeal surge, there is a parallel wave of PE add-on acquisitions — smaller bolt-on deals executed by PE-backed platform companies as part of buy-and-build strategies. These transactions individually are modest in size, but they accumulate: a PE-backed platform that executes four add-on acquisitions in a 12-month period has generated four separate PPA requirements, four sets of intangible asset valuations, four opening balance sheets, and four sets of goodwill that will be tested for impairment annually.

For PE-backed platforms executing a buy-and-build strategy, the cumulative effect matters. Each add-on acquisition generates its own PPA and its own amortization schedule. The stacked amortization from multiple add-on PPAs can materially compress GAAP earnings even when operating performance is strong — a consequence that PE-backed CFOs frequently underestimate when they are focused on operational performance metrics rather than GAAP accounting outcomes.

The PPA Timeline Crisis — Why 90 Days Is Not Enough in the Current Environment

Under ASC 805, the acquirer has up to 12 months from the acquisition date — the measurement period — to finalize the PPA. During this period, provisional amounts can be adjusted as additional information about facts and circumstances existing at the acquisition date becomes available.

Twelve months sounds generous. In practice, for both public and private company acquirers, the functional deadline is significantly shorter — and the 2026 deal environment has made the timeline more compressed than ever.

The 45-Day Problem for Public Company Acquirers

Public companies must file quarterly financial statements within 45 days of quarter-end (for accelerated filers) or 40 days (for large accelerated filers). A company that closes an acquisition on March 15, 2026, must include provisional PPA amounts in its Q1 2026 10-Q filing due by May 15, 2026 — exactly 61 days after the acquisition date.

In 61 days, the company must have completed enough of the PPA to produce provisional opening balance sheet amounts that its auditors will accept for the quarterly filing. The provisional amounts must be sufficiently complete and reasonable to avoid a qualified audit opinion on the quarterly review. In practice, this means the core intangible asset identification and valuation — the developed technology, the customer relationships, the trade name — must be substantially complete within 60 days, not within 12 months.

Early engagement of a credentialed valuation firm during due diligence reduces post-close audit risk and timeline pressure. Ideally the valuation process should begin during due diligence or immediately after signing — not after closing.

For the 2026 deal market — where megadeals are closing with AI-driven intangible asset complexity that requires novel valuation methodology — the 60-day provisional PPA timeline is genuinely insufficient for engagements that are not started until after closing. The megadeals being announced in Q1 2026 that close in Q2 2026 will generate Q2 2026 10-Q provisional PPAs due in August 2026. The valuation teams working on those engagements need to be engaged at signing, not at closing.

The 90-Day Best Practice — and Why the Current Market Is Breaking It

Platforms are encouraged to engage a valuation provider as soon as possible following the deal when data and key information requests are still fresh. The process can be stressful, information-intensive, and time-consuming, sometimes leading to missed audit deadlines.

The industry best practice — 90 days from closing to substantially complete PPA — is already aggressive for complex transactions. Simple transactions typically take 4–8 weeks, moderate complexity with some intangibles take 8–10 weeks, complex transactions with multiple intangibles or international elements take 10–16 weeks, and highly complex transactions in technology or life sciences take 16–24 weeks.

The 2026 deal mix — concentrated in AI-driven technology megadeals and complex PE add-on transactions — skews heavily toward the 10–24 week range. In a normal deal environment, valuation teams absorb this complexity because deal flow is manageable and capacity exists. In the current deal surge, with deal value up 65% year-over-year, the demand for qualified PPA valuation professionals has increased by a comparable margin. The supply of CFA-qualified valuation professionals capable of conducting MPEEM analyses on AI-native technology assets has not increased at the same rate.

The result is a PPA backlog — not in the formal sense of undone work, but in the practical sense of longer timelines, more pressure on provisional amounts, and more situations where the 12-month measurement period is being used not as a luxury but as a necessity.

What the Backlog Means for CPA Firms

For CPA firms managing audit and advisory relationships with acquirer clients, the deal surge has created a specific capacity problem. A mid-size CPA firm with three clients who each completed acquisitions in Q1 2026 now has three simultaneous PPA engagements in queue — each requiring a different sector’s intangible asset methodology, each with a different provisional filing deadline, and each requiring a CFA-qualified valuation analyst whose time is the scarce resource.

The firms managing this well are those that have established white-label valuation outsourcing relationships — enabling them to scale PPA production through Synpact’s India-based team without adding headcount. The PPA brief is submitted after signing, the valuation team is engaged pre-close, and the provisional amounts are ready for the auditor’s review within 45 days of closing. The detailed economics of this model are covered in our practice building guide, but the operational logic in the current environment is straightforward: the deal surge has created more PPA work than most CPA firm valuation teams can absorb, and the overflow goes to outsourced analytical capacity.

WACC Construction in the 2026 Deal Environment — What Has Changed and Why It Matters

Every PPA requires a discount rate. The intangible asset valuations — the MPEEM for customer relationships, the relief-from-royalty for technology and trade names, the excess earnings for assembled workforce — each use a discount rate that must be appropriate for the risk profile of that specific intangible asset class, calibrated to market conditions as of the acquisition date.

In a stable macro environment, WACC construction for PPA purposes is demanding but tractable. The inputs are sourced from established references — Damodaran for ERP, Kroll for size premiums, Bloomberg for beta — and the output is defensible within a range that most Big Four auditors will accept with appropriate documentation.

The 2026 macro environment has made WACC construction for PPA purposes significantly more complex, for three specific reasons.

Reason 1: The Risk-Free Rate Is No Longer Stable

The 10-year US Treasury yield — the standard risk-free rate input for US GAAP valuation — has been affected by competing forces throughout Q1 and Q2 2026. Geopolitical uncertainty from the Iran war creates flight-to-safety buying that pushes yields down. Tariff-driven inflation expectations push yields up. Rising geopolitical uncertainty and inflationary pressures continue to influence deal pricing and timing, particularly in sectors exposed to energy and supply chain volatility.

The practical consequence for PPA WACC construction: the risk-free rate sourced on the acquisition date may differ materially from the rate that would have been used in the pre-signing valuation analysis. A deal that was modeled at a 4.1% risk-free rate in November 2025 and closes in March 2026 at a 4.6% risk-free rate has a 50-basis-point WACC increase embedded in the acquisition date measurement — before any other input changes. At a typical 5-year intangible asset useful life, a 50-basis-point WACC increase reduces intangible asset fair value by approximately 4–6%. On a $500 million PPA, this is a $20–$30 million shift in how value is allocated between identified intangibles and goodwill.

The WACC must be sourced to the exact acquisition date — not the signing date, not a quarter-end date, not an approximate period. For acquisitions closing in a volatile rate environment, this precision is not administrative detail — it is a material input that affects the PPA conclusion.

Reason 2: The Geopolitical Risk Premium — Now a Required WACC Component

As documented in our geopolitical risk premium guide, the 2026 macro environment — Iran war, tariff regime, trade fragmentation — has created measurable, market-priced geopolitical risk that must be reflected in the discount rate for companies with relevant exposure.

For PPA purposes, the geopolitical risk premium question is specific to the acquired business: does the target’s business model, supply chain, or customer base carry geopolitical exposure that was not fully reflected in the purchase price? If so, the WACC used in the intangible asset valuations should reflect that exposure — and the documentation must explain why the premium was or was not applied.

The WACC has increased. The projected cash flows have decreased. The impairment headroom has narrowed or disappeared for acquisitions made on supply chain economics that no longer exist. For acquisitions of businesses with China-linked supply chains, Gulf-transit-dependent logistics, or energy-cost-sensitive manufacturing, the WACC at the acquisition date in 2026 is materially different from the WACC that would have been applied to the same business in 2024.

Reason 3: Beta Instability in the Comparable Company Set

The WACC beta input — derived from a set of comparable publicly traded companies — has been unusually volatile across sectors in 2026. Deal valuations in an 11.6x EBITDA environment leave a narrow margin for error in synergy realization. The equity markets are simultaneously pricing in optimism about AI-driven growth and concern about geopolitical disruption and tariff impact — creating sector-specific beta volatility that makes the comparable company selection and the beta lookback period choice materially consequential.

For AI-driven acquisitions specifically, the comparable company beta screen is challenging: the universe of truly comparable public companies is thin, and the companies that exist have betas that reflect both the AI growth premium and the macro uncertainty discount simultaneously. The analyst must document not just which companies were selected, but why their beta profiles are representative of the acquired business’s systematic risk — and that documentation must survive the auditor’s scrutiny of a market environment that does not have clear historical precedent.

The WARA Reconciliation — The Check That Catches WACC Errors

Every well-constructed PPA includes a Weighted Average Return on Assets (WARA) reconciliation — a cross-check that verifies whether the weighted average of the returns on all identified assets (tangible and intangible) plus the return implied by the goodwill balance equals the overall WACC used in the acquisition analysis.

If the WARA reconciliation does not tie to the WACC within a reasonable range, one of two things is true: either the individual asset discount rates are incorrectly specified, or the WACC itself is incorrectly specified. In a volatile rate environment where individual WACC inputs have moved materially, the WARA reconciliation is more likely to surface inconsistencies — and those inconsistencies, if unresolved, will be identified by the auditor.

Comprehensive valuation reports, detailed assumption support, sensitivity analyses, WARA reconciliation, source data logs, and management representation letters are essential for satisfying Big 4 auditors and withstanding IRS review. In the current deal environment, the WARA reconciliation is not a checkbox — it is the analytical proof that the WACC construction is internally consistent across the full PPA.

The Goodwill Impairment Risk Embedded in 2026 Megadeals

Every acquisition generates goodwill. The goodwill recorded on the opening balance sheet of a 2026 megadeal reflects, in a single number, everything the acquirer paid beyond the fair value of the net identifiable assets — the synergies, the strategic optionality, the assembled workforce value, the going-concern premium, the competitive necessity premium of an AI-driven acquisition in a winner-takes-most market.

That goodwill will be tested for impairment annually — and more frequently if triggering events occur — for as long as the acquired reporting unit exists. The magnitude of goodwill being generated by the 2026 deal surge, combined with the specific characteristics of AI-driven acquisitions at elevated multiples, is creating a latent impairment risk that will not be visible in 2026 financial statements but will emerge in 2027 and 2028 if the expected synergies do not materialise on the expected timeline.

The AI Premium Problem

The primary financial risk in an 11.6x EBITDA environment is multiples compression during the integration phase. As valuations rise, the margin for error in synergy realization disappears. CFOs must prioritize ensuring that acquired capabilities translate into P&L actionability within the first 18 months.

An acquisition completed at 11.6x EBITDA — the current average megadeal multiple — with a 40% acquisition premium generates a goodwill balance that represents a significant portion of the total consideration. The goodwill impairment test under ASC 350 compares the fair value of the reporting unit (measured using DCF and market approaches) to its carrying value (including the goodwill). If the reporting unit’s fair value falls below its carrying value, the goodwill must be impaired.

The impairment arithmetic for a 2026 megadeal is demanding: the deal was priced at a multiple that reflects both the acquired business’s current performance and the expected synergies from integration. If synergies underperform — which happens in a majority of acquisitions historically — the fair value of the reporting unit in the first or second year post-close may be insufficient to support the carrying value. The acquisition premium paid — reflected in the goodwill carrying amount — was calculated on economics that no longer exist for many 2026 acquisitions. The WACC has increased. The projected cash flows have decreased. The impairment headroom has narrowed or disappeared.

The AI Intangible Amortisation Trap

For AI-driven acquisitions, the PPA typically allocates a significant portion of the purchase price to identifiable intangible assets — developed technology, customer relationships, data assets — which are amortised over their useful lives through the income statement. The amortisation reduces reported earnings, which reduces the market’s earnings-based valuation of the reporting unit, which reduces the headroom in the impairment test.

The useful life assumptions assigned to AI-related intangibles in 2026 PPAs are particularly consequential. A developed AI technology platform assigned a 7-year useful life generates amortisation for 7 years. If the technology is superseded by the next generation of AI capabilities in 3 years — a realistic scenario in a field evolving at this pace — the carrying value of the technology asset may exceed its fair value before the original useful life has expired, creating an impairment trigger.

Assigning useful lives without support is a common PPA error. Useful life assumptions need to be grounded in the target’s actual data — customer attrition history, technology refresh cycles, contract terms — not industry averages applied by default. For AI-native technology assets, the historical data on useful life is limited — these assets have not existed long enough to generate the attrition and refresh cycle data that would support a confident useful life determination. The analyst must use judgment, document it carefully, and build in sensitivity analysis that shows the impairment consequence of a shorter useful life than the base case assumes.

The 2021 Vintage Goodwill — Still Present on Many Balance Sheets

Before addressing 2026 deal goodwill, it is worth noting the goodwill risk that already exists on many acquirer balance sheets from the 2021 deal cycle. The technology sector saw extraordinary valuation multiples in 2020–2021, driven by pandemic-accelerated digital adoption, near-zero discount rates, and growth-stock exuberance. Many of those acquisitions generated substantial goodwill. In 2026, with technology multiples substantially compressed and WACCs materially higher, the impairment risk embedded in 2021-vintage technology acquisitions is significant. Specifically exposed: SaaS businesses acquired at 15–25x ARR multiples, B2B software businesses acquired at 10–15x revenue.

A company that completed an acquisition in 2021 at 20x ARR and is now completing an acquisition in 2026 at 8x ARR has two goodwill balances from two different deal cycles — both of which must be tested annually. The 2021 goodwill is the more acutely at-risk balance: the market has re-rated the sector, the WACC has increased, and the revenue multiples used in the market approach impairment test are now materially lower than the multiples at which the original acquisition was priced. The 2026 deal surge is adding new goodwill on top of existing goodwill that is already under impairment pressure.

What Advisory Firms Should Be Doing Right Now — The Practical Implications

For CPA firms, M&A advisory teams, and PE fund CFOs managing the valuation consequences of the 2026 deal surge, here is the specific action framework.

For Deals in Diligence or Pre-Signing

Engage the valuation team at or before signing — not after closing. The intangible asset identification work — mapping the target’s IP, customer base, technology, data assets, and workforce to ASC 805 asset categories — is work that can be started with due diligence materials before the deal closes. Starting pre-close reduces the post-close timeline pressure materially.

For AI-driven acquisitions specifically, begin the data asset and assembled workforce valuation methodology discussion before closing. These are the most novel and most contested intangible categories in the current deal market. Establishing the methodology in advance — with auditor pre-clearance where possible — removes the methodology risk from the post-close timeline.

Companies that delayed M&A activity during the deal drought are now facing a backlog of both deal execution and post-close integration work simultaneously. Advisory firms that position themselves as full-cycle M&A valuation partners — pre-close diligence support, post-close PPA execution, annual impairment testing — are better placed to absorb this backlog than those offering only the PPA component.

For Recently Closed Deals

If the acquisition has closed and the PPA is in progress, verify the WACC is sourced to the exact acquisition date — not a period average, not the signing date. In the current rate environment, this precision matters more than in prior cycles.

Conduct the WARA reconciliation as an explicit step in the PPA, not as a final check. The WARA reconciliation in a volatile rate environment frequently surfaces issues with individual asset discount rates that would not have been apparent in a stable environment. Resolving these issues during the PPA process is far less costly than addressing them when the auditor identifies them during the quarterly review.

For AI-driven acquisitions, prepare a specific useful life memorandum for each AI-related intangible — documenting the basis for the useful life determination with reference to technology refresh cycle data, competitive dynamics in the AI sector, and management’s assessment of the technology’s expected useful life. This memorandum is not standard practice for most PPA engagements — but it will be requested by every sophisticated auditor reviewing a 2026 AI acquisition PPA.

For Annual Impairment Testing

For 2021-vintage technology goodwill — SaaS, B2B software, fintech — conduct a qualitative triggering event assessment for Q1 or Q2 2026 before concluding that no interim test is required. The market re-rating of technology multiples, the increase in WACC from 2021 to 2026, and the compression of revenue multiples in the sector are potential triggering events that must be explicitly addressed and documented.

For 2026 acquisition goodwill — particularly from AI-driven megadeals at elevated multiples — build the impairment test model at the time of the PPA, not 12 months later. The acquisition-date fair value analysis from the PPA provides the baseline for the impairment test. Preserving that analysis — the cash flow projections, the WACC inputs, the comparable multiples — in a format that can be updated for the annual impairment test reduces the effort required and ensures methodology consistency.

The Outsourcing Argument in the Current Environment

The 65% increase in deal value has not been accompanied by a 65% increase in the availability of CFA-qualified valuation professionals in the US. The talent constraint that existed before the deal surge has intensified as demand has increased. CFOs must now prioritize ensuring that acquired capabilities translate into P&L actionability within 18 months — which requires analytical support that in-house teams frequently cannot provide at the current pace of deal activity.

The white-label PPA outsourcing model — engaging Synpact’s India-based valuation team to produce the intangible asset valuations, the WARA reconciliation, and the opening balance sheet in the acquiring firm’s format — is the capacity solution for CPA firms and advisory teams that are managing more PPA engagements than their in-house headcount can absorb. A PPA engagement that takes a US valuation analyst 80–120 hours takes Synpact’s team the same time — but at a fraction of the cost, with overnight delivery on each analytical component, and with the same Big Four-defensible methodology and documentation standard.

The economics and process of the white-label PPA model are covered in our carve-out and PPA guide. The current deal environment makes the case for the model more compelling than it has been at any point since the 2021 deal peak.

→ Submit a PPA Brief — Provisional Opening Balance Sheet in 14 Business Days

The Forward Look — What the Rest of 2026 Brings

Tech remains resilient. Its limited exposure to tariff volatility, the intensifying race to lead in AI, and a declining rate environment continue to support investments in SaaS, cloud, and AI-native platforms. PE firms are targeting mature, earnings-generating tech companies with strong post-listing visibility.

The deal surge that defined Q1 and Q2 2026 shows no sign of decelerating in the near term. The conditions that drove it — easing rates, PE dry powder pressure, AI-driven consolidation urgency, corporate confidence in strategic M&A — are all still present. Morgan Stanley projects 20% growth in global M&A deal volume for 2026, marking a definitive end to the deal making drought.

The valuation implications of this forward deal flow are predictable from the patterns established in Q1 and Q2:

PPA backlogs will persist. The combination of megadeal complexity and a constrained valuation professional talent market will keep PPA timelines under pressure through H2 2026. Firms that have not established outsourcing capacity by mid-year will face the same timeline pressure in Q3 and Q4 that they have already experienced in Q1 and Q2.

WACC volatility will continue. The geopolitical environment — Iran war, tariff regime, election uncertainty in multiple markets — is not resolving in a way that produces stable rate inputs for the remainder of 2026. Every PPA with an H2 2026 acquisition date will require the same precision in WACC sourcing as those with H1 dates.

Goodwill impairment triggers will accumulate. The 2026 megadeal goodwill is not at impairment risk in 2026 — it is at risk in 2027 and 2028 if synergies underperform. The 2021 vintage goodwill is at impairment risk now, and that risk will be tested in the Q2 2026 annual impairment cycle for companies with June fiscal year-ends. The wave of impairment triggers — from both vintages simultaneously — will be the valuation story of 2027.

For now, the immediate priority is managing the Q2 and Q3 2026 PPA pipeline with the analytical capacity to do it correctly. The methodology is demanding, the timelines are compressed, and the market is moving faster than most valuation teams were staffed to handle.

The Surge Is the Headline. The Valuation Backlog Is the Story.

The 2026 M&A surge will be remembered as the year megadeals came back, AI drove consolidation at historically elevated multiples, and PE dry powder finally found a home. That is the headline story, and it is accurate.

The valuation story — the one that determines whether the headline story produces value or destroys it — is written in the PPA. In the WACC. In the useful life memorandum for the AI technology platform. In the WARA reconciliation that confirms the discount rates are internally consistent. In the goodwill impairment test that will be conducted 12 months from now, using cash flow projections that the deal team believed in at the time of closing.

Getting that story right requires valuation professionals who understand both the technical standards and the current macro environment — who can construct a defensible WACC in a volatile rate and risk premium environment, who can identify and value AI-native intangible assets that have no direct precedent, and who can produce audit-ready documentation that survives Big Four scrutiny in a deal cycle that is moving faster than most teams were built to support.

That is the work Synpact does — for CPA firms managing PPA backlogs, for PE fund CFOs needing opening balance sheets on compressed timelines, and for M&A advisory teams supporting the post-close accounting of transactions they advised on pre-close.

The deal surge created the opportunity. The valuation quality determines whether the opportunity becomes value.

→ Submit a PPA or Goodwill Impairment Brief — WARA-Reconciled, Big Four-Defensible, 14 Business Days

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